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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Boerne v. Flores' declared une-
quivocally that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA" or
"the Act") is unconstitutional. Despite the Court's straightforward
opinion, there are commentators and advocates who now assert that
RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal law.2 This Article re-
sponds that the message of Boenze is that RFRA is unconstitutional
under any scenario, whether it is applied to state or federal law.3
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank Tammy Bie-
ber, Henry Monaghan and Steven Smith for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
essay, and Katherine Elms, Erin McGahey and Peter Yu for their valuable research assistance.
Professor Hamilton was lead counsel for the City of Boerne, Texas in Boeme t. Forem 117 S. Ct.
2157 (1997).
1 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2159 (1997).
2 &egenera/ly Appellants Opening Brief on Remand from the Supreme Court of the United
States, Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1997) (No. 93-2267)
[hereinafter Appellant's Brief]; Brief for the Dep't ofJustice as Intervenor, Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1997) (No. 93-2267) [hereinafter D.OJ. Brief];
Brief for the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion as Amicus Curiae, Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 89 F.3d 494 (No. 93-2267) (8th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Coalition
Brief]. See also Stecider v. United States, 1998 WIL 28235 (E.D. La. 1998) ('Requirements of RFRA
remain in effect with regard to federal law or regulation.") Proponents also assert that because
RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal law the Act can be salvaged by severing its invalid
portions, ie., those sections that apply only to state and local governments. D.OJ. Brief. at 15-
17. The contention that invalid portions of RFRA are severable serves only as a red herring.
RFRA's violation of separation of powers principles invalidates the Act in its entirety, whether it
is argued that Congress acted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or pursuant to
Article L
3 See United States v. Tessier, Nos. 96-35801, MT-95-02336-VRH, 1997 %L 650968 (9th Cr. OcL
17, 1997) (after settlement amongst parties, the Ninth Circuit refused the government's request
to vacate the published Bankruptcy Court opinion that held RFRA unconstitutional as applied
to federal bankruptcy law, concluding that "[i]n light of Boerne... it will not spawn any unto-
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The insurmountable fact of RFRA's enactment is that Congress,
at the behest of a powerful group of organized religions, intended to
displace the entirety of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause. This is one instance where a statute's obvious
faults are its most serious faults. RFRA is a straightforward violation
of separation of powers and the Establishment Clause; it hits bed-
rock principles in both constitutional milieus. At a more subtle level,
RFRA is also a violation of the due process required in lawmaking.
Any one of these three theories is sufficient to invalidate RFRA as
applied to federal law.
Before moving to the discussion, it is important to note that Con-
gress does have a modicum of authority to accommodate religion.
Through appropriate exercise of an enumerated power, Congress
can provide exemptions for religious conduct Congress' hand,
however, is not free. Federal laws effecting exemptions are subject to
constitutional limitations -namely, the enumerated powers doctrine
and the Establishment Clause. The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act would have empowered Congress to act without restraint.
II. BOERNE V. FLOES HOLDS THAT RFRA VIOLATES SETTLED
PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
In Boerne, the Supreme Court stated that RFRA "contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the fed-
eral balance."5 RFRA is ultra vires legislation which would have pro-
vided Congress the power to amend the Constitution unilaterally. In
the Court's words, RFRA "appears... to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections. " ' Congress' attempt to revise
the constitutional balance is made transparent by RFRA's awesome
scope, as well as the paucity of the legislative record. This Act, like
no other law enacted before, mimics the scope of the Constitution.
In the words ofJustice Kennedy, RFRA's
[siweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government,
displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every descrip-
tion and regardless of subject matter. RFRA's restrictions apply to every
agency and official of the Federal, State, and local Governments. 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1). RFRA applies to all federal and state law, statutory
or otherwise, whether adopted before or after its enactment. § 2000bb-
ward legal consequences nor have any precedential value") (slip op.); United States v. Grant, 117
F.3d 788, 792 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that Boerne "casts some doubt on the continued viabil-
ity of that legislation in the federal context"); In re Gates Community Chapel of Rochester, Inc., 212
B.R_ 220, 225-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to apply RFRA to action involving federal
bankruptcy law in light of Boerne). See also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir.) (rec-
ognizing that RFRA superseded Smith, "[b]ut the decision in Boerne restored the reasonableness
test as the applicable standard in free exercise challenges").
4 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
Boerne 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
6 Boernev. Hores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170 (1997).
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3(a). RFRA has no termination date or termination mechanism. Any law
is subject to challenge at any time by any individual who alleges a sub-
stantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion.
With this sweeping Act, Congress attempted to usurp both the
courts' role and Article V's amendment procedure.
A. Through RFRA, Congress Has Expropriated the Supreme Court's
Constitutional Duty to Interpret the First Amendment
The Court's decision in Boerne reaffirms that the Supreme Court
is "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."' While
it does not have the power to set the agenda when constitutional
amendments are considered, a power which Congress holds, the Su-
preme Court does have the power to issue the final word on the
meaning of the existing Constitution. In all of its applications, RFRA
subverts this principle. RFRA is a blatant attempt by Congress to re-
write the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause in contravention of
the Supreme Court's interpretation. 9 As such, it is an attempt by
Congress to engage in a hostile takeover of the Court's constitutional
role. In the words of one appellate court judge, RFRA's legislative
history reveals Congress playing the role of
a super-Supreme Court... In essence, Congress has instructed the Su-
preme Court how to interpret the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment... It hardly needs to be said that where Congress and the
Supreme Court are so clearly at odds with each other over the definition
of a fundamental right, the conflict presents an obvious and serious
threat to the delicate balance of separation of power.'°
When the Act is applied to federal law, RFRA's creators and pro-
ponents defend RFRA against separation of powers attacks on the
ground that it is a simple matter of Congress "amend[ing] its laws to
restrain itself."" RFRA, however, does not amend the text of any
federal law. Rather, it changes the way in which the courts scrutinize
federal law. The self-limitation defense of RFRA is a post hoc pretext
for Congress' bold aggrandizement of its powers. "The enactment of
Cooperv. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see Madrbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178
(1803); see also Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1566-68 (8th Cir. 1996) (McMilian.J.. dissent-
See generallyJoanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA
and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L REV. 5 (1995) (arguing hint RFRA is unconstitutional be-
cause it violates separation of power principles); Eugene Gressman. The Neeemsa and Pr'eer
Downfall ofRFRA, 2 NExus, AJouRNAL OF OPINION 33 (1998); Eugene Gressian & Angela C.
Carmella, The RFRA Revision oftheFreeExrcmise Clause, 57 OHIO Sr. LJ. 65,143 (1996).
10 Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1566 (8th. Cir. 1996) (Mcdillian,J., dissenting in part).
1 Coalition Brief at 5.
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RFRA can in no sense be said to involve the 'specially informed legis-
lative competence' of Congress."
2
The attempt by RFRA's supporters to recharacterize this act of
hubris as a mild means of self-limitation is cause for some mirth.
The language and history of RFRA are quite plain. By enacting
RFRA, Congress intended to reject, to reverse, and to eviscerate the
Supreme Court's recent decision under the Free Exercise Clause,
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.'
"[P]oints of constitutional interpretation were debated by Members
of Congress in hearings and floor debates. Many criticized the
Court's reasoning [in Smith], and this disagreement resulted in the
passage of RFRA."" This action is, therefore, a direct attack on the
Court's structural role within the constitutional scheme. Indeed,
the plain language of the Act reveals RFRA as a bald-faced attempt by
Congress to alter the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause as inter-
preted in cases and controversies involving burdens on religious
conduct.
In Smith, the Court stated that burdens resulting from generally
applicable law do not violate the free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment. 6 In RFRA, Congress says the opposite. The first
clause of the statute reads: "The Congress finds that the framers of
the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalien-
able right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the
Constitution."" Congress then proceeds to define the level of pro-
tection to be accorded free exercise of religion:
In general Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability
[unless] ... it is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
12 Keelerv. Mayor and City Counsel of Cumberland, 928 F.Supp. 591, 603 (D. Md. 1996).
13 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See, e.g., Boerne; 117 S. Ct. at 2160 ("Congress enacted RFRA in di-
rect response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)."); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciayy, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 9, 38, 41, 48 (1990); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on
H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8, 19, 23, 32, 39, 45, 63, 160, 193, 201, 214, 249, 251, 271 (1992) [here-
inafter House Hearings]; Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 11 Pub.
Papers 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993). The Smith decision was the singular focus of the hearings held in
support of RFRA. RFRA's legislative history contains no less than 405 pages explicitly making
reference to Smith.
14 Boernev. Hores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 (1997).
15 See Gressman & Carmella, supra note 14 at 70. See also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Law-
rence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Con-
duc 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1310-11 (1994) (interpreting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128 (1871) to mean that "Congress cannot enlist the judiciary in a charade, requiring it
to apply a given statutory standard in a manner when the charade implicates.. . religious lib-
erty").
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-882.
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1) (Vest 1997).
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and... is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest"
The separation of powers violation inherent in RFRA is so evident
that one is tempted to assume Congress meant something other
than what it said. Such an assumption would be a mistake. With
RFRA, Congress has acted out of manifest disrespect for the Su-
preme Court as an institution, and has done so in the most unsubtle
fashion imaginable. Congress based its decision to alter the balance
of power between church and state under every law in the land solely
on its distaste for Smith.' 9 Congress attempts to paper over this un-
constitutional grab for power with a handful of anecdotes relating to
isolated incidental burdens on religious practice. " The Act's legisla-
tive history, however, is replete with members of Congress castigatinq
the Court for its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith._
Indeed, the President fully understood and endorsed this usurpation
of the courts' role in the federal system when he hailed RFRA on the
ground that it "reverses the Supreme Court's decision [in] Employ-
ment Division against Smith."- In measured tones, the Supreme
Court responded in Boerne
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best
when each part of the government respects both the Constitution and
the proper actions and determinations of the other branches. When the
Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province
of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.
When the political branches of the Government act against the back-
is 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a), (b) (West 1997).
19 Congress was extraordinarily uninformed on the actual holding and implications of Srith.
Cf. Boe'n 117 S. Ct. at 2171 ("[T]he Act imposes in eiery case a least restrictive means require-
ment - a requirement that was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRa purported to
codif.. ."). Smith is not the attack on religious liberty depicted by its opponents. The Court
adhered to its long-standing position that religious belief is afforded absolute protection. See
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; Reywds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879). While it held that inci-
dental burdens on religious conduct arising from neutral, generally applicable lawI are not sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, it opened the door to the application of strict scrutiny in certain circum-
stances. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (where there is indihidualized determination); lMsonsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (where there is a hybrid claim); Larson v. Vaente, 456 U.S. 228, 246
(1982) (where there is discrimination). See also Church of the Ltdrumi Babalu Aye, Inc. t City of
Hiaeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Finally, the Court made it clear that carefully crafted exemptions
for burdened religious conduct may well pass muster both in the legislature and in the courts.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
- Boenev. Rores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997) (using term "anecdotal').
21 See The Rdigious Freedom Restoration Ad: Hearings on S.2969 Before the Senate Comr. on theJudi-
dary, 139 Cong. Rec. S14350-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) ("The [Smith decision] dealt a serious
setback to this first amendment freedom.") (statement of Sen. Eduard Kennedy); id. at S14353
(statement of Sen. Onin Hatch) ("[I]n [S]mith, the Court departed from well established prin-
ciples embodied in the [F]irst [A]mendment."); 137 Cong. Rec. E2422 (daily ed.June 27, 1991)
(The Smith decision was "a dastardly and unprovoked attack on our first freedom.') (statement
of Rep. Stephen Solarz).
Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration ACt of 1993, 11 Pub. Papers 2000
(Nov. 16, 1993).
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ground of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it
must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles,
including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one
before us; but the provisions of the federal statutes here invoked are be-
yond congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA,
which must control.23
The Court further responded by discussing its most important
separation of powers case, Marbuiy v. Madison, as follows:
Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated
powers. The judicial authority to determine the constitutionality of laws,
in cases and controversies, is based on the premise that the "powers of
the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.2 4
According to Marbuy, the Constitution is "superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means." It is not "on a level with ordi-
nary legislative acts, and, like other acts ... alterable when the legis-
lature shall please to alter it."
2 6
Marbuy was decided in the context of Article I, at a time when
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was not yet conceived.
From the beginning of the Regublic, the Court has been charged
with "say[ing] what the law is." Boerne stands for the proposition
that the Court's role in interpreting the Constitution was not un-
dermined or lessened as a result of the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is certainly nothing in Boerne that would give
support to the reasoning that Marbuty is now a dead letter when
Congress acts pursuant to Article I, though still good law under Sec-
tion 5. Indeed, the Boerne opinion makes clear that the reasoning of
Marbury is essential to the preservation of the Constitution's delicate
balance of power in all circumstances. In Boerne, the Court warns of
the consequences of abandoning the approach dictated by Marbury
-consequences that result whether Congress is purportedly acting
under Article I or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
"[s] hifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution .... ,""
Through RFRA, Congress has attempted to insert itself in the
Court's realm. The extent to which Congress overtakes the Court's
role is evident in the fact that RFRA not only overturns the Court's
Boenew, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (citation omitted).
24 Id. at 2162 (citations omitted).
25 Marbury, 1 Cranch at 177 cited in Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
26 Id.; seeAppellant's Brief at 3; D.O.J. Brief at 9, 20; Coalition Brief, at 6-9. The discussion
of Marbury in Boerne is relevant equally to RFRA's application to state law as to federal law. To
view discussion otherwise would mean that Marbury has less force when read in the context of
Article I's enumerated powers than when read under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Marbury, 1 Cranch at 177.
28 Boernev. Fres, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1997).
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decision in Smith, but also pre-Smith decisions that applied less than
strict scrutiny. It eviscerates the Court's settled approach to free ex-
ercise claims by prisoners.' It overturns the Court's discretion to
engage in deferential review of decisions by the military," and it
heightens the level of review to be alplied in cases that involve gov-
ernment services and federal lands. In the face of the Boeme
Court's discussion of Marbury, any court that would uphold RFRA as
applied to federal law poses for itself a seemingly insurmountable
task.
B. Through RFRA, Congress Usurped Article V's Amendment Procedure
The Court explains its decision to invalidate RFRA by criticizing
the Act as an attempt to amend the Constitution in the absence of• 2
Article V procedures. That RFRA is an effort to amend the Consti-
tution in the absence of Article V procedures is evidenced clearly on
the face of the statute as well as from the legislative record. Insofar
as RFRA applies in every circumstance in which religion could be
burdened by society's laws, RFRA reproduces the Constitution's
breadth.s RFRA applies to every law, passed by every government, at
any time in the United States. In the words of the Court, RFRA's
"[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of govern-
ment, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every
description and regardless of subject matter."" RFRA is not a deci-
sion by Congress to provide measured relief to identified burdens on
2 See Turer v. Saflhy, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) ("[W,]hen a prison regulation impinges on in-
mates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate pe-
nological interests."); and O'Lone v. Estate of Shaba-, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (same principle).
See also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d at 736 ("RFRA not only superseded Smith, but it also replaced
the standard used in prisoners' free exercise challenges.").
See Goldman v. einbergef, 475 U.S. 503,506-07 (1986) (appl)ing heightened scrutiny under
Shrert, but adjusting that level of scrutiny down-ard because "[courts must give great defer-
ence to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of
a particular military interest").
si See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemeiy Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (refusing to apply
Sherbert analysis to government construction on Indian lands notiuthstanding that such con-
struction "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices"); Bowen v. Ra,
476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986) (declining to apply compelling interest test to claim that Social
Security regulations violated benefit applicant's free exercise of religion).
Boeme. 117 S. Ct. 2157,2168 (1997).
s3 The only way in which RFRA differs from the Constitution itself is in the fact that it can be
repealed by Congress, a fact raised by the proponents of RFRA in its defense. Coalition Brief at
12. Yet, this quality of RFRA simply reveals the enormous power of constitutional revision that
Congress has granted itselE If RFRA is good law, Congress can alter the constitutional balance
benween federal branches and beneen church and state whenever it summons a majority vote.
For example, if it likes the compelling interest test on Monday, it can codify it, and then repeal
it in favor of a different standard on Tuesday.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (1997).
s5 Boern' 117 S. Ct at 2170.
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religion, as the Court invited in Smith, 6 but rather an unapologetic
grab for power and a gratuitous handout to religion.
If RFRA is deemed constitutional as applied to federal law, it
would endow Congress with the authority to alter the constitutional
balance between church and state through nothing more than a ma-
jority vote. Whenever Congress disagreed with the Court's interpre-
tation of the Constitution, it would be able to alter unilaterally the
balance of power embodied in the Constitution. There would be no
need to debate the merits of a constitutional amendment regarding
school prayer, or abortion, or equal rights for women. In the Court's
words, "[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the Constitu-
tion and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment
process contained in Article V."37 To forestall the instability atten-
dant upon changing constitutional requirements, Article V's onerous
procedures stabilize the United States' system of representative de-
mocracy by delaying the rush to alter the constitutional equilibrium.
The model suggested by RFRA invites destabilization and the unilat-
eral adjustment of power by interest groups rather than by the citi-
zens of this country.
RFRA is an ingenious attempt by Congress to revise its role in the
constitutional scheme. It is nothing less than a challenge to the very
structure of the Constitution. Were RFRA good law, Congress could
overtake the role of the Court and effect changes in the Constitution
without satisfying the arduous requirements of Article V. RFRA is a
means by which Congress could make the Court's interpretations of
the Constitution superfluous. Whether applied to state or federal
law, RFRA plainly violates the separation of powers and undermines
Article V of the Constitution.
III. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT VIOLATES THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In his concurrence in Boerne, Justice Stevens points out that RFRA
is a rather straightforward violation of the Establishment Clause:
"[Its] across-the-board" readjustment of church-state relations knows
no precedent.s8 In every dispute religion could possibly have with
government, RFRA has handed religious interests "a legal weapon
that no atheist or agnostic can obtain."" If a philosophical book-
store conflicts with any law, it has no extra help under RFRA. If a
club wants to avoid the application of environmental or bankruptcy
law, it cannot do so unless it is religious. In Justice Stevens' words,
6 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
37 Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
38 See Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative
Power, 73 TEx. L. REv. 247, 294 (1994) (RFRA is "an across-the-board mandate of accommoda-
tion for all religious claimants in all governmental situations.").
39 Boerne v. lores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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"[t]his governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irrelig-
ion, is forbidden by the First Amendment."0
In its most recent Establishment Clause case, Agostini v. Felton,"
the Court did not alter general principles used to evaluate Estab-
lishment Clause cases, but rather collapsed the three-part Lemon v.
Kurtzman2 test into a two-part test. The Court instructs that in an Es-
tablishment Clause case, courts must "ask whether the government
acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion" and
"whether the [law] has the 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting relig-
ion."43 The Agostini Court identifies what had been a third inquiry
under Lemon - the question whether the law induces an excessive
entanglement between church and state - as an element of the "ef-
fects" test described above." In addressing whether a law has the ef-
fect of advancing or inhibiting religion, the Agostini Court suggests
that courts look to "the character and purposes of the institutions
that are benefited [by the law], the nature of the aid that the State
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government
and religious authority."
The application of the Agostini "effects" test to RFRA readily re-
veals RFRA's constitutional flaws. First, the institutions benefited by
RFRA are purely religious in character.6 The law is only triggered
when religious conduct is burdened by a generally applicable and
neutral law. 47 RFRA displaces the Smith standard of review in every
case and controversy involving burdens on religious conduct," and
Id. (citing Vallce v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1985)). Sce aiso Board of Edut. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dia ,. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (SouterJ.).
Little can be drawn from the fact thatJustice Stevens is the only member of the Court to
address the Establishment Clause in Boeme v. Roar He, along with five otherJusdices disposed
of RFRA's constitutionality on separation of powers and federalism grounds while the three in
dissent urged reargument and rebriefing on the vitality of Smit& Significantly, none of the Jus-
tices took issue with his concurrence. In fact, none of the Justices' opinions would preclude
them from joiningJustice Stevens' Establishment Clause reasoning if the issue of RFRA's appli-
cation to federal law ever made it to the Supreme Court.
41 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
4 Agostini, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997).
Id. at 2015.
Idi quotingLemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (1971).
See eg., Idleman, supra note 42, at 285-86 ('Most strikingly, [RFRA's] principal purpose is
to advance religion, or at least to advance the free exercise thereof, relative to other conscien-
tious conduct that is not deemed religious.").
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (1997).
48 This displacement is made obvious in Christians v. Crystal Evangdical Fret Church, 82 F.3d
1407 (8th Cir. 1996), where a panel of the Eighth Circuit decided, ithout ever reaching First
Amendment claims, that the relevant bankruptcy code provision vijolated RFRA by substantially
burdening the debtor's tithing practice. IL at 1416. "[E]mploying RFRA, as opposed to the
analysis under [Smith], 'caused' the reversal in the current case ... Put another way, 'but for the
passage of RFRA, the [church] could not have succeeded on [its] free exercise challenge." ld.
at 1421 n.1 (BogueJ., dissenting). Following its decision in Bovnem, the Supreme Court vacated
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replaces it with a standard that gives religion significantly more lev-
erage against duly enacted federal laws. This is an obvious and direct
benefit to religion.
Second, the nature of the aid provided is a drastic standard of re-
view that applies in every circumstance in which religious conduct
might be burdened by neutral, generally applicable laws. In Justice
Stevens' words, it is a potent "legal weapon."
Third, the resulting relationship between the government and re-
ligious authority is one of excessive entanglement. RFRA creates an
incentive for Congress to ask whether a law will place unintended,
incidental burdens on any religious conduct every time that it enacts
a new law.50 RFRA's enormous breadth means that Congress can
only answer that question with massive oversight and study of all
faiths practiced in this country. Under RFRA, the government must
exercise special care for every religion if it is going to avoid costly
litigation over every law. By contrast, the Smith scenario, which per-
and remanded the panel's decision in Christians for reconsideration in view of Boerne. Christians,
117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
49 Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Act requires govern-
ment to prove "a compelling interest" and that the law challenged is the "least restrictive
means." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. While the Court has employed the compelling interest test in a
handful of free exercise cases, it has not used the least restrictive means test. Boerne, 117 S. Ct.
at 2171.
so The relationship between religion and government during the enactment of RFRA is also
troubling although it does not fit into one of the Court's Establishment Clause pigeonholes.
RFRA was drafted by, lobbied for, and continues to be supported by a group of individuals who
represent organized religions. This group united for the sole purpose of overturning the
Court's decision in Smith. When they lost in the Supreme Court in Boerne, they continued their
crusade by imploring Congress to do "something else" to help them, see Hearings on "Protecting
Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Rores" Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Committee
on the Judiciamy, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 14, 1997), and by going to the states to obtain pref-
erential legislation in each state. Congress passed the language handed to them by organized
religious groups without evidencing any independent judgment. It did not investigate the few
empirical claims made by the Coalition and certainly engaged in no independent inquiry to de-
termine if the Coalition's proposals were needed, justified, or sound. The relationship between
religion and the government during RFRA's passage was the very union of power feared most by
the Framers and especially James Madison. SeeJames Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Con-
vention of 1787, at 76 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966). Although the full quotation
is long, it is worthy of reprinting here:
All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, & interests, as they
happened to consist of rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed, the manufacturing,
the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the disciples of
this religious Sect or that religious Sect. In all cases where a majority are united by a
common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are
to restrain them? A prudent regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found
by experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect for
character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or
praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in
individuals: In large numbers, little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion itself may be-
come a motive to persecution & oppression. These observations are verified by the Histories of
every Country ancient & modern.
Id. at 428 (emphasis added) (referring to abuses by British Parliament prompted by "Religious
parties").
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mits legislative exemptions urged by those religions actually bur-
dened, contains no such incentive."
The Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion (hereinafter "the
Coalition"),52 has made the argument that if "Congress cannot [pass
RFRA], then all exemptions for religious conduct throughout fed-
eral law are unconstitutional unless they are required by the Free
Exercise Clause - a position that the Court has unanimously re-
jected."53 The Coalition simply misunderstands the constitutional er-
ror at the heart of RFRA: while exemptions may pass constitutional
muster if carefully crafted to meet the requirements of the Free Ex-
ercise and Establishment Clauses,s' they cannot be effected blindly
and en masse
Religious liberty is not nearly as simplistic as RFRA's supporters
imply. They argue that the Constitution sets the floor for religious
liberty, and that Congress may then add to that floor as it sees fit.
This view of religion as an unlimited benefit to society is a view that
would have been alien to the Framers. The records of the Constitu-
tional Convention illustrate that there can be too much liberty for re-
ligion. The Framers crafted a constitutional scheme intended to
achieve a pragmatic balance of power between church and state."
Religion is protected from the state under the Free Exercise Clause,
while the state is protected from religion under the Establishment
Clause.- Thus, Congress does not have a free hand to supplement
liberty.57 The Establishment Clause provides a ceiling that does not
permit the government significant room within which to expand re-
ligious liberties.
51 Employinent Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
52 Members of the Coalition include, among others: American Baptist Church USA, Ameri-
can Jewish Congress, Church of the Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Church of Scientology In-
ternational, Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. Native American
Church of North America, Presbyterian Church, and United Methodist Church. The Catholic
Church has not joined the Coalition because they had some initial objections to RFRA. As
Boerne makes dear, however, the Church has taken the lead in funding litigation aimed at vindi-
cating RFRA in the courts.
Coalition Brief at 3.
54 See, eg., Smith, 494 U.S. at 890; Texas Month, Inc, v. Bullo&, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989) (strik-
ing down Texas statute that exempted religious periodicals from a sales and use tax, because the
exemption "lacks a secular objective that would justify this preference along with similar benefits
for nonreligious publications or groups, and because it effectively endorses religious belief');
Corporation of the PreidingBishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding exemption of religious
employers from Tide Virs requirement that employers refrain from discriminating on the basis
of religion); Wa/Z v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for
religious organizations).
See Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitution's Pragmatic Balance of Pouwr Between Church and State.
2 NEXUS, AJoURNAL OF OPINION 33 (1998).
See 60 Madison, supra note 58, at 76-77 (statement of James Madison discussing the tT-
ann of factions including "religious Sects").
See D.O.J Brief at 18-20; Appellant's Brief at 17; Coalition Brief at 14.
19981
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Whenever faced with Free Exercise or Establishment Clause ar-
guments, the courts are, and should be, acutely aware that they are
piloting a boat that must maneuver its way between Scylla and Cha-
rybdis. Whether a law accommodates appropriately a religious prac-
tice or breaches the Establishment Clause is almost always a close
question.ss Indeed, the Court monitors its religion clause jurispru-
dence to ensure that the lines it has drawn pursuant to the Estab-
lishment Clause result in an appropriate and pragmatic balance of
power between church and state.' 9
Thus, accommodation of the free exercise of religion requires
close attention and careful lawmaking. RFRA attempts to undercut
this balance by granting Congress greater latitude to determine the
scope of religious freedom. RFRA's one-size-fits-all formula does not
show Congress acting pursuant to the suggestion for exemptions
found in Smith. Rather, it illustrates Congress at its worst: acting at
the behest of a group of organized religions, giving more to religion
than religion has ever received in American history," and shrugging
off the careful weighing which the accommodation of religious prac-
tices requires.
RFRA's introduction of a new and imposing standard of review is
an unalloyed benefit for religion. There is no vacuum of power be-
tween the government and religion. By shouldering the least restric-
tive means test in all circumstances, Congress has eased the path of
religion in all scenarios touched by federal law. Some have sug-
See, e.g., Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5-25 (Brennan, J.); id. at 25-26 (white, J., concurring);
id at 26-29 (Blackmun, O'Connor, ji., concurring); id. at 29-45 (Scalia, Kennedy, 1J., and
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
59 See Agostini v., 117 S. C. 1997, 2010 (1997). See also, Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (holding that statute that created special school district to
follow village lines of religious organization violates Establishment Clause); Zoberst v. Catalina
Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (Deaf student attending Catholic high school entitled to
be provided with interpreter under government program); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (state program to assist blind student in pursuing degree at
Christian college did not violate Establishment Clause); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
(holding that City's Board of Education program sending public school teachers into parochial
schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children violated Establishment Clause)
overruled by Agostini, 117 S. C. 1997.
The name, "Religious Freedmn Restoration Act" is a euphemism. See Boerne, 117 S.Ct. 2157,
2172 (1997). The Act does not "restore" the law of the Free Exercise Clause to the standards
applied before the Smith decision, but rather institutes an across-the-board, extraordinarily high
standard virtually unprecedented before Smith. Id. at 2171. Congress was well aware of the
harsh new standard instituted by RFRA. See David M. Ackerman, CRS Report for Congress, The Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Freedom Act: A Legal Analysis at 22 (Apr. 23, 1993)
(stating that RFRA would give more protection for religious liberty in cases involving "military
regulations, prison regulations, and government's management of its internal affairs. The
RFRA.. . contain[s] no such exceptions: strict scrutiny would be applicable to all government
action burdening religious exercise"). Moreover, the Act requires government to prove the law
is the "least restrictive means," a tailoring requirement never embraced by the Supreme Court.
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
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gested that Congress is simply monitoring its own enactments
through RFRA and that Congress should be permitted to place hard-
ships on the enforcement of its own laws."' This approach mistakes
the substantive character of RFRA for a mere procedural nicety.
Those defending RFRA as an amendment to federal law ask that
courts take a leap of faith when a facial challenge to the Act arises.
RFRA's proponents do not deny that the enumerated power upon
which RFRA is based cannot be discerned on the face of the statute.
However, they argue that an appropriate enumerated power will sur-
face each time the courts apply RFRA to a federal law. This construc-
tion argument cleverly immunizes RFRA from a facial attack on the
grounds that Congress has inadequate power to enact such a law. In
effect, the more broadly and generally Congress acts, the more likely
that it can avoid having its laws invalidated by the courts at the facial
stage. Thus, the benefit to religion is accomplished not only
through the introduction of strict scrutiny in all cases, but also
through delayed judicial review of RFRA's constitutionality.
RFRA directs the courts to impose an extraordinary burden of
proof on the federal government for the sake of religion.2 Thus,
Congress has provided, in one grand gesture, a powerful tool to lev-
erage the accommodation of all religious conduct - regardless of
the federal interest at stake. There may be constitutional authority
for Congress to limit the scope of its enactments through a single
amendment. However, no such authority exists to provide unimag-
ined benefits to religion in every circumstance in which religion is
burdened by generally applicable, neutral law. Having chosen a
standard of review that draws a boundary between church and state,
and that has the inevitable effect of benefiting religion in every in-
stance, Congress has seated religion in a throne of power.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amoso the case relied upon
most heavily by RFRA's supporters, illustrates the close attention to
detail necessary to justify and craft constitutional exemptions. In
Amos, the federal government exempted religious employers from
Title VII's requirement proscribing discrimination on the basis of re-
ligion by employers.6 The Court upheld the exemption, stating that
without it, the government would become entangled with religion.
In other words, the exemption was necessaiy to avoid an Establish-
ment Clause violation.6
Comparing RFRA to Amos is like comparing apples to oranges.
RFRA, unlike Amos, does not exempt religion from regulation for the
purpose of avoiding an Establishment Clause violation. Rather,
61 1&
62 SeBoemn 117 S. Ct. at2171.
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
6 See id at 329 n.1.
6 See I&t at 338-39.
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RFRA institutes a standard of judicial review in every case which im-
plicates religious conduct. In turn, this standard of review creates
incentives for government to monitor, watch and keep track of the
theological tenets of every religion in society. If government is to
avoid the costly litigation attendant upon a multiplicity of RFRA
claims, it must scrutinize every law that it passes with the interests of
every religion in mind. It is not enough to be neutral. Government
must also be vigilant for religion. By instituting an extremely de-
manding standard of judicial review applicable in every case which
implicates religious conduct, RFRA creates incentives for govern-
ment to become a theological overseer.
RFRA induces the very sort of entanglement that the law in Amos
avoided. Amos did not involve a law that exempted religion from
every law in the country. Rather, it permitted the exemption of relig-
ious employers from a particular requirement in prescribed circum-
stances.6 The law in Amos lacked RFRA's vast scope; therefore, Amos
cannot dictate how RFRA fares under the Establishment Clause.
In sum, RFRA engineers a society in which religion is preferred
over irreligion and advocates a system that encourages the govern-
ment to monitor and study religion. Both evils violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.
IV. RFRA REPRESENTS ULTRA VIRES CONGRESSIONAL AcTION
"Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of
enumerated powers."67 RFRA is fascinating precisely because it fails
to indicate which Article I power justifies its application to federal
law. Nothing on the face of the Act states which enumerated provi-
sion Congress used as the source of its power to direct the courts'
application of strict scrutiny whenever a law substantially burdens re-
ligious conduct. The only constitutional provisions to which RFRA
refers are the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.'
Neither, of course, is an enumerated power. They are, rather, limita-
tions on the exercise of Congress's enumerated powers.
66 The law at issue in Amos, section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (West 1997), exempts religious organizations only from the re-
quirements of that subtitle, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and only from its require-
ment that employers refrain from discriminating on the basis of religion. See Amos, 483 U.S. at
329 n.1.
67 Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997) citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (West 1997).
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A. Congress' Threadbare Consideration of RFRA's Constitutionality, as
Applied to Federal Law, Leaves the Constitutional Basis for RFRA Unclear
and Undeserving of Deference
Though replete with criticism of Smith, the legislative history of
RFRA does not address the issue of Congressional authority to alter
the balance of power between church and state by providing religion
with "a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain.""' As
support for Congressional authority, the legislative history invokes
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 is not, however,
available to the federal government as a vehicle to regulate federal
law.
70
In the following paragraph, the Congressional Research Service
disposed of the question of Congress' power to enact RFRA as ap-
plied to federal law.
With respect to the Federal government, Congressional power to enact
RFRA would seem to derive from the necessary and proper clause of Ar-
ticle I, Section 8, of the Constitution. The First Amendment, like the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, imposes a limitation on
governmental power with respect to religion by providing that Congress
shall make no la..... prohibiting the free exercise (of religion) ... Just
as Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress broad author-
ity to implement the provisions of that Amendment, the necessary and
proper clause gives Congress broad authority to formulate and adopt
measures it deems necessary to carry out the other mandates of the Con-
stitution. ChiefJustice Marshall described the broad scope of the power
conferred by the necessary and proper clause in M'Cullodi v. Marjlan&
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist w.ith the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 
'
The Congressional Research Service seems to imply that the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause modifies the First Amendment, as though
the First Amendment is an enumerated power. Such a view turns the
Constitution on its head, because it engrafts Article I's enabling
clause onto an explicit limitation, and thus transforms limitations
into powers.72
Article I contains no enumerated power that permits, much less
directs, Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights against itself. Congress
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens,J., concurring).
70 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Ad: Ltting tle Fox Into the Henhouse
Under Cover of Section 5 of the Foutenth Amendment, 16 CRDOZO L REv. 357, 370, 378-79 (1994)
[hereinafter Henhouse].
7 David K. Ackerman, CRS Report for Congress: The Religious Freedom Restoration Ad of 1993: A
Legal Analysis 35 (Doc. 93-446A) (April 23, 1993); see also David M. Ackerman, CRS RPuort for
Congress: The Religious Freedom Restoration Ad and The Religious Fredom Ad: A Legal Anahsu 30-31
(Doc. 92-366A) (April 17, 1992) (identical language).
'2 See Henhouse, supra note 72, at 362-65.
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can only address rights indirectly through the appropriate exercise
of a particular enumerated power.73 For example, in Heart of Atlanta
Motel,74 the Court upheld Congress' solution to the problem of dis-
crimination in places of public accommodation as a valid exercise of
its power under the Commerce Clause because the discrimination
adversely affected interstate commerce. In contrast, Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to enforce constitutional
obligations directly, and reflects the shared conclusion that another
tool was required to bring the states within constitutional bounda-
ries.75 If there were any basis in the Constitution for Congress to at-
tempt "a substantive change in constitutional protections," it would
have been under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 Since
Boerne rejected such a power under Section 5'77 it is inconceivable
that such a power would exist under Article I.
Congress seems to believe that the Necessary and Proper Clause
was sufficient unto itself to support to RFRA . Yet, the Necessary
and Proper Clause cannot, by itself, justify congressional action. Two
days after the Boerne decision was announced, the Supreme Court
tellingly characterized the Necessary and Proper Clause as the "last,
best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action., 79 By
this, the Court meant to reinforce the notion that the Necessary and
Proper Clause must be linked to a specific enumerated power. By
referring only to the Necessary and Proper Clause and no other
enumerated power, Congress left the basis for RFRA unclear. Where
Congress' power to enact a particular act is not "visible to the naked
eye," congressional findings "enable [the courts] to evaluate the leg-
islative judgment" that the legislature was acting within constitu-
tional boundaries."0 The findings in this instance evidence Con-
gress's purpose to overturn Smith and nothing more.
Congress simply did not consider meaningfully the difficult ques-
tion of its power to enact RFRA as applied to federal law. The record
accords the courts nothing on which to peg a theory of constitu-
tional power. This procedural failure should doom RFRA. As a
structural, constitutional principle, the courts should not create ar-
guments to justify such legislation after the fact, but rather should
73 See Heart of Atlanta Mote, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964); Henhouse, supra
note 72, at 366-67.
74 Id.
75 See Boerne, 117S. Ct. at 2170.
76 Id.
77 See Id.
78 See H.R. Rep. No. 88, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. 10 (1993) ("[T]he Committee believes thnt
Congress has the constitutional authority to enact [RFRA] ... [p]ursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause embodied in Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution.").
79 Printz v. U.S., Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4044, 41.
so United States v. Lope, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
[Vol. 1: 1
RFRA IS UICONSTTITTIONAL, PERIOD
send the law back to Congress so that it can engage in the delibera-
tion necessary to make its laws both apparently and actually constitu-
tional. As the Supreme Court explained in Boerne:
When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has
not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the
meaning and force of the Constitution.. .James Madison explained that
'it is incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch of tie Gov-
ernment as to any other, that the constitution should be preserved en-
tire. It is our duty.' Were it otherwise, we would not afford Congress the
presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy. 1
In other words, the jurisprudential presumption of constitution-
ality rests on the empirical assumption that Congress embraces its
duty to examine the constitutional basis of its actions. This check on
Congress' power is grounded in common sense. In fact, it is essen-
tial to preserving a system of shared and coordinate power among
the federal branches. The federal source of power for RFRA is puz-
zling and troubling. The courts should not defer to Congress for the
following reasons:
First, in circumstances where Congress is attempting to police
fundamental rights, the rule that congressional action must be lim-
ited to enumerated powers should be observed with the greatest
care. The First Amendment is a limitation on congressional author-
ity, not a sphere of power.2 Just as Lopez protected federalism con-
cems by refusing to uphold a statute whose constitutional basis was
"not visible to the naked eye, "8s the courts should protect First
Amendment interests by refusing to uphold statutes, the basis of
which are opaque.
Second, the courts should not articulate independently an enu-
merated power for a statute where there is strong evidence that Con-
gress has failed in its constitutionally-appointed role to be the inde-
pendent policy decisionmaker for the national polity." To the
extent that Congress has rubber stamped the actions of particular in-
terest groups without consideration of the polity's concerns, the
courts should read the enumerated powers requirement strictly.
Third, the enumerated powers doctrine should be read with in-
creased vigor when Congress develops an utterly new form of law,
like RFRA, and provides no explanation of its source of power. In
this arena, the courts should not fill in the blank left by Congress. It
is Congress' obligation to elucidate the basis of new law.
91 Boernev. lores 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1997) citingJames Madison. 1 Annals of Congress
500 (1789).
82 SeeHenhouse, supra note 72, at 362.
83 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,563 (1995).
U Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of &lf.Rule z.th an
Attorneship Model of Representalion, 69 N.Y.U. L REV. 477,522 (1994); sew alo Hans A. Linde. Due
Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L REV. 197 (1976).
95 See Boenze, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
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B. RFRA Does Not Satisfy the Requirements of McCulloch v. Maryland
The doctrinal question is whether a law satisfies the requirements
of M'Culloch v. Maryland As described by Chief Justice Marshall,
the test for determining whether Congress has acted within its power
is as follows:
[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional. 7
The discussion of separation of powers and the Establishment
Clause in this Article makes clear that RFRA does not meet this stan-
dard. First, the language and history of the Act reveal two ends that
are far from legitimate: (1) reversal of the Supreme Court's decision
in Smiths and (2) privileging religion by affording it per se more
power against government than any other entity. Neither is legiti-
mate. The former violates the separation of powers doctrine, and
the latter violates the Establishment Clause.
Second, Congress' unilateral decision to alter the effect of the
Free Exercise Clause through a simple majority vote is not "within
the scope of the constitution." 9 That job, if assumed at all, is best
left to Article V and supermajorities of Congress and the states.9
The Coalition's defense of RFRA as a simple amendment to every
federal law is a pretext for what is, in reality, a constitutional
amendment.
Third, RFRA's "means" are not "appropriate."' They constitute a
directive to the lower courts to ignore the Supreme Court's standard
of review. In its stead, they adopt Congress' preferred standard in
cases and controversies raising free exercise claims.92 Rather than
providing for exemptions in circumstances where religious conduct
is in fact burdened by a generally applicable law,93 Congress decided
to invade the courts' domain. RFRA is nothing more than a bald-
faced attempt to commandeer the Court's interpretation of the Con-
stitution. It is not the legitimate exercise of a power granted to Con-
gress by the Constitution.
86 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819).
87 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
88 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)
(compelling religious bodies to comply with generally applicable laws).
8 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819).
90 U.S. CONsT. art. V.
91 M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
92 See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57
OHIO ST. LJ. 65, 66, 98-102 (1996; see a/so, Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word:
The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5,6, 13-19 (1995).
9 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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Finally, RFRA is not "consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution."4 It is a unilateral attempt to revise the meaning of the
Constitution; it transforms the First Amendment into an enumerated
power and it elevates religion above all other interests in society.
Moreover, it boldly invades the courts' terrain. Any one of these
characteristics alone would undermine the structural integrity of the
Constitution. Taken together, they are a frontal assault. RFRA is ul-
tra vires.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Boerne left RFRA proponents lit-
tle room to maneuver. Like all important constitutional law deci-
sions, the case was about power. RFRA, in fact, prompted a primer
on constitutional power. In Boerne, the Court declared that Congress
lacks the power to reverse the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution. 5 Further, the Court stated that Congress may not re-
adjust the balance of power between church and state unilaterally."
When the Court reaches the question of RFRA's constitutionality
as applied to federal law, it may have the opportunity to address
RFRA's Establishment Clause and due process of lawmaking defects.
It could point out that Congress must articulate the constitutional
basis upon which it acts when it attempts to regulate First Amend-
ment freedoms in gross, when it responds reflexively to a powerful in-
terest group, and when it devises a new statutory form. This is a fair
burden if Congress's enactments are to be accorded deference. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is unconstitutional, period.
9 M'Cullodz, 17 U.S. at 421.
95 Boernev. Rores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172 (1997).
9 I&at2171.
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